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NATIONWIDE, STATE LAW CLASS ACTIONS
AND THE BEAUTY OF FEDERALISM
JESSE TIKO SMALLWOOD
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
1
rest of the country.

INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, nationwide, state law class actions have
2
received a chilly reception in federal courts. At first, this hostility was
aimed at class actions involving novel, nationwide mass tort claims,
such as tobacco and asbestos litigation. Recently, however, federal
courts have even started to question the propriety of nationwide class
actions involving consumer fraud claims—the exact genre of cases
class actions were intended to address. Although federal courts have
put forth many legal rationales for refusing to certify such claims, in
essence their rulings represent a challenge to the inherent usefulness
of class action litigation for these types of claims.
Instead of eliminating these class action claims, these efforts have
ironically made them more lethal. In response to the chilly reception
in federal courts, plaintiffs have simply migrated to more receptive
3
state forums. Filing their claims simultaneously in numerous,
sympathetic state courts, plaintiffs have found success where they
previously failed in federal court. Though commentators have decried

Copyright © 2003 by Jesse Tiko Smallwood.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There
Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2000) (“Since
1995, federal courts have articulated an increasingly conservative class action jurisprudence that
has directed federal courts to stringently scrutinize proposed litigation and settlement classes.”).
3. Id.
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4
these forum shopping tactics and the lax certification standards
5
employed by many states, efforts to enact a comprehensive solution
6
have failed to date.
This situation has left defendants in a bind. Facing the likely
prospect of at least one state certifying a nationwide class, and absent
reprieve from Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court, defendants have
been forced to search for alternative methods of achieving closure
and avoiding costly trials. A nationwide settlement class is one such
solution. Though defendant corporations would obviously prefer to
have class treatment denied all together, some defendants have
concluded that, absent this option, a quick, final, and preclusive
agreement might be the best that can be hoped for in this situation.
For class action settlements to have preclusive effect, however, a
court must still certify the class; and after the Supreme Court’s ruling
7
8
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, under Federal Rule 23, a
settlement class must meet almost all of the same, strict certification
9
standards required for trial classes. Amchem’s effect has been to
make settlement classes more difficult to certify in federal courts.
Amchem, however, does not apply to state courts. Thus, the same

4. See, e.g., Edwin Lamberth, Comment, Injustice by Process: A Look at and Proposals for
the Problems and Abuses of the Settlement Class Action, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 149, 159–62 (1997–
98) (claiming that cases such as Cox v. Shell Oil, Civ. A. No. 18844, 1995 WL 775363 (Tenn. Ch.
Nov. 17, 1995), represent a negative trend of forum shopping by class action counsel); Thomas
Merton Woods, Note, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solutions for Class Action
Jurisdictional Reform, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 507, 514–15 (2000) (arguing that empirical evidence
suggesting a pattern of forum shopping by plaintiffs’ attorneys demonstrates the need for some
federalization of class actions).
5. See, e.g., John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case
out of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 160 (2001) (suggesting that certain
counties and states have become magnets for nationwide class action filings); Victor E. Schwartz
& Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through Litigation Has Gone Too
Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1217–18 (2001) (arguing that one reason for the increasing trend of
state courts certifying nationwide class actions is the desire of activist judges and plaintiffs’
attorneys to regulate through litigation); Glenn A. Danas, Comment, The Interstate Class Action
Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J.
1305, 1321–23 (2000) (stating that proponents of the Class Action Fairness Act often cite
examples of lax enforcement of class action procedures in certain states as a rationale for the
Act).
6. See infra notes 98–1108 and accompanying text.
7. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. This Note incorporates the most recent amendments to Federal
Rule 23, which went into effect in December 2003.
9. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–21. The only difference between trial and settlement class
actions is that the latter do not have to meet the manageability requirement that applies to trial
class actions, because settlement classes will never actually be tried in court.
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defendants who have criticized state courts for their alleged abuse of
the class action system are now also turning to state courts for
assistance. Though the number of these cases is still small, this
approach represents a growing trend.
As a result, state courts increasingly face an uneasy dilemma:
whether to certify a nationwide class for settlement purposes when it
is unclear that the class could be approved for trial purposes. Talalai
10
v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. provides a recent example of the
manner in which state courts are attempting to resolve such a
dilemma. The case arose from a plaintiffs’ claim that Cooper Tire had
knowingly sold and marketed defective tires to customers while
taking efforts to hide these defects.11 Upon reaching a settlement, the
New Jersey Superior Court certified a nationwide class for settlement
purposes,12 even though it was unlikely that a federal court, and even
perhaps a New Jersey state court, would have certified such a class for
trial purposes.
The case’s central significance lies in its symbolic representation
of an emerging dilemma facing class action defendants and state
courts: how best to provide finality and closure to nationwide, state
law class action suits given that the federal courts are increasingly
resistant to such claims and a national solution is still elusive. This
13
issue has been generally underemphasized by commentators, who
instead highlight the negative aspects of these cases, such as the
potential for forum shopping, and point the finger of blame at either
conniving plaintiffs’ attorneys or lax state court judges.14 In contrast,
this Note attempts to provide a more balanced analysis of the
problem, placing these cases within the larger context from which
they have emerged. It argues that Cooper Tire does not symbolize the
failings of overambitious state courts or conniving plaintiffs, but
rather the beauty of federalism. Failing to receive guidance from the
federal level, state courts have, out of necessity, begun experimenting
with their own class action rules and statutes. The Note suggests that
the New Jersey Superior Court took advantage of its liberal, class
action statute to provide needed finality to the case. In essence, the
10. No. L-008830.00 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. Sept. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Final Order]
(granting final certification of class and final approval of settlement), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/coopertire/opinion_091702.pdf.
11. Id. at 3–4.
12. Id. at 2.
13. See infra notes 200–208 and accompanying text.
14. See id.

SMALLWOOD.DOC

1140

07/07/04 1:39 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1137

court stretched state law, if not departed from it entirely, to craft a
solution to this pressing problem.
Part I provides an overview and summary of Cooper Tire. Part II
places the case in its larger context, describing in detail the underlying
tensions motivating the Cooper Tire court’s decision. Part III analyzes
the approach taken by the Cooper Tire court, exploring first the legal
support for its holding, and second whether such a decision is secure
from collateral attack. Finally, Part IV examines and highlights the
lessons to be drawn from the case. It first addresses the criticisms that
various commentators have expressed concerning the growing
involvement of state courts with nationwide class actions, and then
proposes a solution to these concerns that also accounts for the larger
problem of achieving closure for class action defendants.
More specifically, the solution is the creation of a two-tiered class
action rule under Federal Rule 23: one standard for trial classes, and a
more lenient standard for settlement classes. To be sure, the problem
of overlapping class actions both deserves and demands a
comprehensive solution, and this may not be the most comprehensive
one. However, although many solutions of great merit have been
15
proposed, they have not been, and may not be, adopted. Given the
failures to adopt more comprehensive solutions, a two-tiered class
action rule represents the best temporary solution to the problem.
I. DESCRIPTION OF COOPER TIRE
The Cooper Tire court’s certification of the settlement class and
approval of the settlement agreement were the concluding notes of a
contentious litigation battle that had raged over the preceding twelve
months. This litigation grew to include over one-hundred law firms
and a multitude of parallel cases progressing in different
16
jurisdictions. When the dust cleared, New Jersey had, for its first
time, certified a nationwide class for settlement-only purposes.17 This
Part tells the story of how and why it happened.

15. See infra Part II.C.
16. Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Joint Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Proposed Class
Action Settlement at 4, Talalai v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. L-008830.00 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law. Div. Sept. 13, 2002) (No. L-008830.00) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memo] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
17. A New Jersey court has, however, certified a nationwide, state law class action for trial
purposes. Kropinski v. Johnson & Johnson, No. A-3979-97T1, 1999 WL 33603132 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 1999).
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On October 27, 2000, the plaintiffs, on behalf of the owners of
approximately 170 million tires manufactured by Cooper Tire, filed a
nationwide class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
alleging violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
18
(NJCFA). They claimed that Cooper Tire produced tires with
adhesion problems and that, instead of discarding these defective
tires, Cooper Tire covered up the defects and then knowingly sold
and marketed these defective tires to its customers.19 The claim was
limited solely to consumer fraud allegations—it did not include
products liability or personal injury claims.
Shortly thereafter, thirty-two similar statewide class actions were
20
filed in other states. Only the New Jersey class action was brought as
a nationwide class action.21 After Cooper Tire removed all thirtythree cases to federal court, the plaintiffs were successful in
remanding their claims in five of the states—New Jersey, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Maine, and North Dakota.22
To handle the complexity of these multiple proceedings, the state
and federal judges involved embarked on a coordination plan that
23
was precedent-setting for its level of cooperation. The federal claims
were consolidated in the Southern District of Ohio under 28 U.S.C. §
1407, the Multidistrict Litigation Act (MDL).24 The state court judges
also agreed that a coordinated approach was the best way to handle
these cases. Therefore, they decided to stay their proceedings and
defer to New Jersey for resolution of the case.25 New Jersey was

18. Final Order, supra note 10, at 3.
19. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Cooper Tire (1) used improper ingredients
in its tires, which led to the production of tires with adhesion problems, (2) improperly decided
to sell these defective tires instead of discarding or rejecting them, (3) attempted to “awl” or
otherwise eliminate the manifestation of these adhesion problems prior to sale, and (4) violated
consumer fraud statutes throughout the country in its efforts to cover up these adhesion
problems. Id. at 3–4. “Awling is a process in which a tire is punctured with an ‘awl’ or an ice pick
to eliminate visible gas bubbles or blisters that result from hot, trapped gas.” Id. at 3 n.2.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5.
23. See id. at 5–6 (“Although this cooperative practice is alluded to in the Manual for
Complex Litigation (Third Edition 2000), this appeared to be the first case to actually
implement this level of interstate coordination.”). The courts constantly shared information on
the status of their claims and often held joint interstate telephone hearings for the resolution of
discovery issues. Id. Further, the courts and parties hired a special master to coordinate the
pretrial proceedings and serve as mediator. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6–7.
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chosen because it was home to Cooper Tire’s largest tire distribution
26
27
center; it also had a broad consumer fraud act.
Despite this coordinated effort, the cost of the litigation quickly
blossomed. Counsel costs for both parties, prior to the negotiation of
28
the settlement, were estimated at $57 million per year. As the
litigation progressed and the legal costs continued to mount, pressure
for settlement grew. By October 2001, the parties reached a
settlement agreement that would cover all purchasers of Cooper
Tire’s steel-belted radial tires in the United States from January 1,
1985, to January 6, 2002.29 Deciding to pursue this nationwide
settlement in the state courts, on October 26, 2001, the parties
submitted this agreement to the New Jersey Superior Court for
preliminary approval.30 Although the settlement class was a
nationwide class, it excluded all consumers who had sustained
31
personal injury or property damage from the defective tires.
The proposed settlement comprised three parts: an enhanced
warranty program, an enhanced finishing inspection program, and a
32
consumer education program. The enhanced warranty program
stated that the settlement class members whose tires incurred an
33
“adjustable separation” could either receive a replacement tire at no
cost or cash reimbursement for the faulty tires.34 The enhanced
finishing program was designed as an overinspection program to
35
prevent defective tires from reaching consumers again. Finally, the

26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. at 56.
29. The potential size of the class was estimated at 42,500,000. Id. at 17.
30. To facilitate the New Jersey court’s settlement of the case, the federal court to which
the federal claims had been transferred stayed its proceedings. Id. at 8–9.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id. The settlement also included a resolution of counsel fees. Id.
33. An adjustable separation means “an adjustable condition determined by and in
accordance with [Cooper Tire’s] standard adjustment policies, procedures and manuals.” Id. at
20 n.7.
34. Id. at 22. This enhanced warranty program had an estimated value of $6 to $10 per
person and thus represented a cost to Cooper Tire of approximately $1.2 billion to $1.7 billion.
Id. at 23–25. Further, it was estimated that Cooper Tire’s cost of replacing the defective tires
could exceed $3 billion. Id. at 25–26.
35. Specifically, Cooper Tire agreed to implement monthly inspections of its plants, a
physical inspection process for its tires, metering of tires to tire inspectors, and other procedures
for ensuring the quality of its tires. Id. at 16–18. Further, Cooper Tire reaffirmed that awl
venting is no longer an approved procedure for the repair of inner liner blisters on cured tires.
Id. at 19.
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consumer education program required Cooper Tire to take measures
to educate the public about tire maintenance, proper actions to be
36
taken in the event of separation, and proper troubleshooting.
In return for these commitments, the settlement agreement
provided Cooper Tire with a release from future claims by all class
37
subscribers. Specifically, the release stated that all class members
who did not opt out of the settlement would be precluded from
bringing any claim—whether under state or federal law—based on
the consumer fraud claim in question.38 The release did not preclude
class members from bringing future suits for personal injuries or
39
property damage resulting from the defective tires.
Before reaching the question of certification, the Cooper Tire
court addressed several threshold issues. First, it held that New Jersey
40
was an appropriate forum because the defendants had agreed to it,
Cooper Tire had its largest distribution center in New Jersey and did
41
significant amounts of business there, the court found no evidence of
any material conflict between New Jersey’s consumer protection
statutes and similar laws in other states,42 and any impropriety was
43
cured since out-of-state class members could opt out of the class.
Second, based upon the U.S. Supreme Court case Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts,44 the court held that there was “no question that this
court has constitutional authority to adjudicate a nationwide

36. Id. at 27–28. Specifically, Cooper Tire was required to set up a telephone helpline, a
website, and point-of-purchase materials information. Id.
37. Id. at 30.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id.
42. Id. New Jersey employs a “governmental interest analysis” for choice-of-law
determinations, which “requires application of the law of the state with the greatest interest in
resolving the particular issue that is raised in the underlying litigation.” Id. at 33 (quoting
Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 109 (N.J. 1996)). A choice-of-law question does not arise,
however, if the court concludes that no actual conflict exists between the law of the forum state
and the laws of other jurisdictions. Here, the court concluded both that New Jersey had the
greatest interest in resolving this particular issue and that no significant conflict existed between
the forum state and the laws of other jurisdictions. Id. at 34.
43. Id.
44. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The court emphasized the Shutts opinion in its Final Order. Final
Order, supra note 10, at 35 (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811–12).
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consumer fraud class action settlement, as long as due process
45
requirements are satisfied.”
Turning to the issue of certification, the Cooper Tire court found
certification to be proper. First, it emphasized New Jersey’s liberal
granting of class certification in cases involving consumer fraud
46
claims. Such treatment of consumer fraud claims is justified because
these cases “are the very type of actions for which class certification is
47
‘particularly appropriate.’” Second, it applied the class certification
standards set forth in New Jersey’s class action rule and found
certification to be appropriate.48 New Jersey’s class action rule
contains the same basic requirements as those found in Federal Rule
49
23. Thus, to certify a class, a court must find that the class satisfies
the following four basic requirements: (1) numerosity of possible
plaintiffs, (2) commonality of legal or factual issues, (3) typicality, and
(4) adequacy of representation of absent class members.50
Additionally, for money damages claims, two additional requirements
must be met: (1) predominance of issues common to the class over
individual issues and (2) superiority of the class action mechanism as
a tool for solving the dispute.51
Analyzing each requirement in order, the court found such
requirements satisfied, and thus it certified the class. Most relevant to
the scope of this Note is the court’s analysis of the predominance and
superiority requirements. In regards to the predominance
requirement, the court held, without further explanation, that
52
common issues predominated over any possible individual issues.
45. Talalai v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., MID-L-8839-00 MT, at 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Oct. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Preliminary Certification] (citing, in support of this proposition,
the New Jersey federal district court’s order remanding the case back to the state court).
46. Id. at 7–8, (“As stated by the Appellate Division, ‘[f]or nearly thirty years, our highest
court has instructed trial courts to liberally allow class actions involving allegations of consumer
fraud.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 807,
814 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)).
47. Id. at 8 (quoting Delgozzo v. Kenny, 628 A.2d 1080, 1086 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993)).
48. Final Order, supra note 10, at 52. New Jersey’s class action certification standards—
enumerated in New Jersey Court Rule 4:32—are modeled upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and thus are identical to the federal rule.
49. N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:32-1.
50. N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:32-1(a).
51. N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:32-1(b)(3). For a more expanded discussion of these class action
certification requirements on the federal level, see 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.1 (4th ed. 2002).
52. Preliminary Certification, supra note 45, at 15.
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Turning to the superiority element, the benefits of a class action in
this case were found to clearly outweigh any problems it would
create. Emphasizing that this was a prototypical negative value
53
claim, the court stressed that “class actions are particularly useful
where it is unlikely that individual claimants will file an action and the
rights of the members of the class would not be vindicated if the class
action procedure is not used.”54
Having certified the settlement class, the court then proceeded to
approve the settlement agreement preliminarily, finding that
“[n]either plaintiffs nor the court can guarantee a better result for the
55
class if this case is tried.” On January 29, 2002, a fairness hearing was
held, at which twenty-six persons filed objections to the settlement
agreement.56 However, only a few months later, all those who had
objected through counsel withdrew their objections, leaving only
57
seven pro se objectors. Finally, on September 13, 2002, the court
issued its final approval of the settlement agreement, effectively
58
concluding the litigation.
II. FRAMING COOPER TIRE IN ITS LARGER CONTEXT
To understand fully the importance of Cooper Tire, one must
step back to see the case in its larger context, recognizing the
unspoken challenges and issues that appear to be driving the court’s
ruling. On its face, this appears to be nothing more than a state court
certifying a settlement class. However, this case can also be seen as a
state experimenting with, and perhaps stretching, its own laws to
provide closure to the parties involved and a solution to a problem
created by federal inaction. Although many commentators have
criticized such experiments, when analyzed in this larger context, a

53. A negative value claim is one in which the value of the claim to the plaintiff is so small
that it would not be worthwhile for the plaintiff to bring the case individually: it would only
make sense to bring the case as an aggregated class action. 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note
51, § 5.7.
54. Preliminary Certification, supra note 45, at 15.
55. Id. at 18.
56. Final Order, supra note 10, at 37–40. Four main categories of objections were raised:
(1) the absence of a settlement provision regarding immediate inspection and/or replacement of
tires, (2) the small likelihood that the defendant would comply with the terms of the settlement,
(3) the small value provided to class members in the settlement, and (4) the gross
disproportionality of attorneys’ fees relative to the relief afforded to class members. Id. at 40.
57. Id. at 39.
58. Id. at 2. The remaining objectors did not appeal the settlement.
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different story emerges. This Part explores the larger context in which
Cooper Tire was decided and explains the difficulties facing the
parties and the state court alike.
A. Growing Hostility to Class Actions in Federal Courts
Underlying the Cooper Tire court’s ruling has been the federal
courts’ recent attack on the application of the class action mechanism,
59
especially in the context of nationwide, state law claims. Class
actions—as we know them today—were created in 1966 and are
embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.60 An
underlying rationale for the class action device has long been its
61
ability to provide relief for negative value claims. Negative value
claims, such as those brought in Cooper Tire, involve situations in
which a defendant has allegedly inflicted a small injury upon a large
number of persons. Absent a class action mechanism, it is unlikely
that these individuals would bring suit for such injuries because
individuals’ litigation costs would exceed the expected damage award.
Thus, class actions were created, in part, to make it possible for
negative value suits to be aggregated, thereby making such claims
more economically feasible.
Despite intense early opposition to the class action mechanism,62
by the 1980s, Rule 23 had been generally accepted and was routinely
applied by the federal courts in an increasingly broad range of areas.63
59. This Note focuses on nationwide, mass tort, products liability, and consumer fraud class
action claims. It does not discuss the application of class actions to other types of claims, such as
securities litigation or antitrust litigation, where courts may be more receptive to the use of the
class action mechanism. It also does not focus on class actions that are brought solely on a
statewide basis.
60. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 12 (2000).
61. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (“The use of the classaction procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for named
plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought
otherwise.”); Ryan P. Phair, Comment, Resolving the “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Rule
23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 837 (2000) (noting that one of the
three primary goals of the class action mechanism is to “distribute greater justice by establishing
a collective action vehicle for small plaintiffs lacking incentives to litigate on their own because
the costs of litigation outweigh the potential value of their claims”).
62. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 60, at 15 (describing the early opposition to the revised
Rule 23 and noting that “[f]rom the earliest stage of its drafting, the revised Rule 23 was
enmeshed in controversy”).
63. See id. at 22 (noting that by the 1980s “the controversy over class actions seemed to die
down” and “[c]lass action practice . . . entered a period of relative tranquillity”); Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action
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For example, by the mid-1980s, federal courts were using the class
64
action mechanism for mass tort claims. Strong evidence suggests that
the drafters of Rule 23 did not fully anticipate the application of class
actions to such claims, fearing that the individual questions raised by
these personal injury claims would overwhelm the common questions
65
of fact and law. However, as the number of mass tort cases grew in
the 1980s, some federal courts embraced the class action procedure as
a means of handling these massive cases.66 Some of the best known of
67
68
69
these cases involved asbestos, Agent Orange, and Dalkon Shield.
By the mid-1990s, however, the federal courts had become
increasingly resistant to certifying nationwide, mass tort class actions
and were actively attempting to restrict their use in this context, if not
eliminate them entirely. Emphasizing the difficulty of resolving
complex choice-of-law issues and stressing the highly individualistic
factual and legal determinations on which these cases often turn,
70
federal courts often refused to certify such classes.
Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 679–80 (1979) (arguing that by 1973, a period of
“sophistication, restraint, and stabilization in class action practice” had taken hold).
64. Generally speaking, mass torts include situations where “consumers of drugs and
medical devices, and workers and others exposed to toxic substances, sued manufacturers for
injuries allegedly associated with these products.” HENSLER ET AL., supra note 60, at 22.
65. See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The Implications of the
New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1559, 1569 (2000) (“[T]he advisory committee clearly did not envision the routine use of
class actions in mass tort litigation.”). Though the drafters of the revised Rule 23 did not address
mass torts in the Rule’s text, the committee stated that the class action mechanism would most
often not be appropriate in the context of mass accidents “because of the likelihood that
significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways.” Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure,
39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (Advisory Committee’s note).
66. See Darren M. Franklin, Note, The Mass Tort Defendants Strike Back: Are Settlement
Class Actions a Collusive Threat or Just a Phantom Menace?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 163, 170 (2000)
(“From the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, however, courts began to embrace the class action
as a means to dispose of duplicative mass tort litigation.”).
67. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming a
district court order certifying a class in Texas asbestos litigation).
68. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming a
district court order certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class in Agent Orange Litigation).
69. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming a class action suit
against the Dalkon Shield product liability insurer in litigation related to the A.H. Robins
Chapter 11 proceeding).
70. For instance, in In re American Medical System, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996), the
Sixth Circuit ordered the district court to decertify a nationwide class action against two
different manufacturers of inflatable penile prostheses. Id. at 1074. Taking note of a “national
trend to deny class certification in drug or medical product liability/personal injury cases,” id. at
1089 & n.24, the court denied certification on the ground that “in medical device products
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The hostility toward class actions has not been limited to
nationwide, mass tort claims however. Rather, several recent rulings
illustrate that federal courts have become more resistant to certifying
classes involving nationwide, state law negative value claims—claims
for which class actions were intended. For instance, in
71
Bridgestone/Firestone, the Seventh Circuit decertified a nationwide
class of sport utility vehicle owners whose cars were equipped with
defective tires. The class, as in Cooper Tire, was limited to those
persons whose tires had not failed and who were only seeking
compensation for the risk of failure, as reflected in the diminished
resale value of the vehicles and mental stress.72 Thus, this was a
consumer fraud claim, not a personal injury claim. The Seventh
Circuit, with Judge Easterbrook writing for the panel, ordered
decertification of the class, employing similar arguments to those used
in cases decertifying mass tort claims—predominance, superiority,
and choice-of-law concerns.73 For instance, noting the choice-of-law
issues, the court held that “[b]ecause these claims must be
adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single
nationwide class is not manageable.”74

liability litigation . . . the factual and legal issues often do differ dramatically from individual to
individual,” id. at 1084. Further, the court found that individual trials would be superior to a
nationwide class given the complexity of the claim. Id. at 1085. Using similar reasoning, in
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit decertified a
nationwide class of cigarette smokers because the trial court “failed to consider how variations
in state law affect predominance and superiority” under Rule 23. Id. at 740. The court
concluded that “[i]n a multi-state class action, variations in state law may swamp any common
issues and defeat predominance.” Id. at 741. See also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 779 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing a district court’s
certification of a nationwide settlement class and ordering the court on remand to focus on the
“commonality and typicality problems” with the class and to “determine whether the national
scope of the class litigation and plethora of defenses available in different jurisdictions prevent
these requirements from being met”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295–1302
(7th Cir. 1995) (ordering the district court to decertify a nationwide class action against the
manufacturer of blood solids due to choice of law concerns and a determination that the class
action procedure was not the fairest and most efficient method for trying such a case).
71. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
72. Id. at 1014–15.
73. Id. at 1015.
74. Id. at 1018. Of course, a federal court could, theoretically, bifurcate such a claim and
create a two-phase trial. Phase I would try the issues of fact common to the entire class (e.g.,
defendant’s negligence). Phase II would then try, in individual trials, all of the issues and
defenses particular to each individual (e.g., causation, injury, reliance, etc.). This approach has
been adopted by many, including Judge Easterbrook, in employment discrimination cases. See
Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1865 (2000) (discussing Easterbrook’s practice of
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This hostility toward nationwide, consumer fraud class action
claims does not appear to be limited to the Bridgestone/Firestone
decision. Even more recently, using almost identical arguments to
those in Bridgestone/Firestone, the Southern District of New York
refused to certify a nationwide class of individuals who had consumed
75
As in
Rezulin, a drug intended to combat diabetes.
Bridgestone/Firestone, the plaintiffs framed the issue as one of
consumer fraud, rather than personal injury, and focused their claims
for damages on restitution of the drug’s price rather than actual
injuries suffered.76 The Rezulin court did not accept this argument,
finding that “[t]he pretense that there are no damage claims asserted
on behalf of plaintiffs and class members [was] inconsistent with the
pleading.”77 However, comparing this case to Bridgestone/Firestone,
the court held that, even if viewed as a consumer fraud claim, the
proposed class failed the predominance and superiority
requirements.78
Taken as a whole, these cases represent, at a minimum, a
challenge to the use of the class action procedure for nationwide,
state law claims. However, they can also be read as a larger challenge
to the concept of class actions generally. Though the courts have
focused on specific reasons for refusing to certify the various cases,
their comments reflect larger and deeper misgivings about the
appropriateness of the class action concept, especially on this large,
nationwide scale. For instance, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Judge
Posner expressed grave concerns that “[o]ne jury, consisting of six
79
persons . . . will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its hand.”
According to Judge Posner, this should “not be tolerated when the
alternative exists of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting
in the aggregate a much larger and more diverse sample of decisionmakers.”80 Judge Easterbrook in Bridgestone/Firestone was even more
bifurcating employment discrimination classes). Likewise, this approach has been employed by
some courts in products liability cases. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Products Liability Class
Actions: Essential Jurisprudence, in PRODUCTS LIABILITY: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 213,
238–42 (2003) (discussing the trend of bifurcating products liability class actions). However, this
approach is time intensive, and it has not been adopted by a majority of federal courts for these
nationwide, mass tort or state law class actions.
75. In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
76. Id. at 62.
77. Id. at 68.
78. Id. at 71.
79. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
80. Id.
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explicit in condemning the underlying rationales of class actions. He
asserted that a class action model that consolidates the trying of such
cases would suppress information vital to accurate resolution and that
81
any benefits of such a model would be “elusive.” He argued instead
for a market model: “Markets instead use diversified decisionmaking
to supply and evaluate information. . . .This method looks ‘inefficient’
from the planner’s perspective, but it produces more information,
more accurate prices, and a vibrant, growing economy. When courts
think of efficiency, they should think of market models rather than
central planning models.”82 As one author notes, these cases “serve[]
as a bookend to the class action litigation over the previous twenty
years, resurrecting . . . the dogged dedication to the individual caseby-case adjudication model as the only means of securing fair,
efficient case resolution.”83 Further, “[f]or the most part, federal trial
and appellate courts alike have taken cues from these and other
recent opinions that seem to decline class certification based not so
much on the language of Federal Rule 23, but on a palpable judicial
84
antipathy toward the class action device.”
These recent decisions are symbolic of a larger and deeper
undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the underlying concept of the
class action mechanism. For instance, in 1996, the Federal Civil Rules
Advisory Committee proposed a new factor (F) to be added to
Federal Rule 23(b)(3), which would require judges entertaining a
class certification motion to consider “whether the probable relief to
individual class members justifies the costs and burdens of class
85
litigation.” Support for this proposal was spurred by several reported
cases where large class actions resulted in little or no gain for the
actual class members. In the most notorious of the cases, Kamilewicz
v. Bank of Boston Corp.,86 absent class members actually lost money
as a result of the approved settlement.87 This proposed factor (F),

81. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
82. Id.
83. Danas, supra note 5, at 1318.
84. Id. at 1319.
85. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 559
(1996).
86. 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. The suit challenged the manner in which the bank calculated the amount of surplus
each member of the class was required to maintain in their escrow accounts. Id. at 508. While
the settlement approved by the state court resulted in an award of up to $8.76 for class
members, their award was reduced by up to $90 as a result of the attorneys’ fees awarded to the
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therefore, represented an attack on one of the central, underlying
rationales for the class action procedure—the small negative value
claims. Although the Advisory Committee eventually tabled this
88
proposal, opponents of the class action procedure continue to
advance these arguments today.89 Thus, the combination of these
cases and reform efforts seem to bespeak an unease and hostility to
the concepts justifying the class action mechanism as a whole; at a
minimum, they highlight the federal courts’ recent efforts to restrict
the use of class actions in nationwide, state law claims.
B. Migration of Nationwide Class Actions to State Courts
The federal courts’ growing hostility to this genre of class actions,
however, was not a death knell for these claims. Instead, plaintiffs
have simply started filing their nationwide class actions in state
courts.90 Although it was unclear at first whether a state court’s
certification of a nationwide class inherently violated due process
principles, the Supreme Court’s holding in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts91 opened the door to such cases. In Shutts, the Supreme Court
held that state courts could certify a multistate class action and assert
jurisdiction over absent class members so long as certain minimum
due process requirements were met.92 Further, a state could properly
apply its own laws to the entire multistate class, so long as the state
had “significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice . . . is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.”93
As a result, the 1990s saw a massive increase in the number of
nationwide class actions filed in state court. According to one study,
“class action activity has grown dramatically [since the mid 1990s]”

plaintiffs’ attorneys. Id. at 508–09. The result was a net loss of money taken from their bank
accounts.
88. Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”:
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 141–
42 (Spring/Summer 2001).
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-130, at 8 (2002) (citing the Bank of Boston case as a prime
example justifying support for the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, a bill that
would essentially federalize nationwide class actions).
90. See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
91. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
92. Id. at 811–12.
93. Id. at 818.
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94
and the growth was “concentrated in the state courts.” Another
study indicated that while federal court class actions increased by 340
percent during the 1990s, state court class action filings increased
1,315 percent.95 Not only were plaintiffs moving to state courts in
greater numbers, but they were finding success there. As plaintiffs
filed their nationwide claims in states with lax class action standards,
classes often got certified when they would have failed in federal
courts.96

C. The Dilemma
This chain of events has created a problem for class action
defendants in nationwide mass tort or consumer fraud cases. Often,
plaintiffs will now file class actions in several different states.
Accordingly, the likelihood that at least one of the states will certify
the class is enhanced. Further, defendants are oftentimes unable to
remove these claims to federal courts because the claims involve state
law claims (instead of federal questions), and diversity jurisdiction
usually does not apply.97 As a result, defendants in these cases are left
with the unappealing prospect of facing overlapping class actions.

94. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
15 (1997), quoted in Beisner & Miller, supra note 5, at 157.
95. Analysis: Class Action Litigation—A Federalist Society Survey, Part II, CLASS
ACTION WATCH (Federalist Society, Washington D.C.), Spring 1999, at 3 fig.2, available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/classactionwatch/classaction1-2.pdf, noted in Beisner &
Miller, supra note 5, at 157.
96. As the congressional report accompanying the Class Action Fairness Act of 2002
asserts:
Although class action certification standards do not differ radically throughout
America’s Federal and State courts, certain county courts in the State systems have
shown very lax attitudes towards class certification. . . . Indeed, the record contains
examples of cases in which Federal Courts denied class certification based on due
process concerns, but State courts subsequently certified classes anyway.
H.R. Rep. No. 107-370, at 15–16 (2002). In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Fuel Tank
Products Liability Litigation, 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998), is a prime example of such a case. In
this case, a Louisiana state court certified a nationwide class for settlement purposes even after
the Texas Supreme Court and the Third Circuit respectively refused to certify an identical
claim. See White v. General Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480, 484 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (certifying
the class); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 465–70 (describing
the General Motors case).
97. Diversity jurisdiction often does not apply because the Supreme Court has determined
that the criteria stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are met only if all of the class members are seeking
damages in excess of the statutory minimum—$75,000. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,
293 (1973); see also Danas, supra note 5, at 1332. There is currently an entrenched circuit split
among the federal courts of appeals as to whether Zahn has been overruled by the adoption of
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Stromborg Metal Works, Inc. v.
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In response, class action defendants have pushed several
proposals in recent years that would address this problem. However,
to date, none of these efforts have been successful. Most prominently,
legislation has been introduced in Congress that would amend 28
U.S.C. § 1332 to expand federal diversity jurisdiction over interstate
class actions. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 is the most recent
98
example. The Act would permit defendants to remove state court
class actions to federal courts when there is minimal diversity (that is,
when any member of the proposed class is a citizen of a state different
from any defendant) and the aggregate amount in controversy among
all class members exceeds $5 million.99 Though the United States
House of Representatives approved the bill by a vote of 253-170 on
100
June 12, 2003, the bill appears stalled in the Senate. On October 22,
2003, supporters of the bill failed to defeat a filibuster by one vote,

Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that section 1367 did overrule Zahn
and thus that if at least one named plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, that
is sufficient to satisfy the requirement); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Leonhardt v. W.
Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 641 (10th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
and holding that section 1367 does not overrule the Zahn requirement that each individual class
member must meet the amount in controversy requirement); Meritcare Inc., v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (same). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this
issue in In re Abbott Labs., but after the recusal of one Justice, it affirmed without opinion by an
equally divided Court. Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000). Thus, the matter has yet to be
resolved. Regardless of the outcome of this string of cases, removal of state law class actions will
continue to be difficult to accomplish, because diversity jurisdiction will not exist if a named
plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as the defendant, regardless of the citizenship of the rest of
the class. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969). Therefore, class action plaintiffs are easily
able to avoid diversity jurisdiction simply by naming a nondiverse plaintiff as the class
representative.
98. In the House, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 is listed as H.R. 1115, 108th Cong.
(2003). In the Senate, the bill has been introduced several times, first as S. 274, 108th Cong.
(2003), and later as S. 1751, 108th Cong. (2003). The discussion here will refer to the most recent
form of the bill.
99. H.R. 1115 § 4(a)(2); S. 1751 § 4(a)(2) (2003). However, to ensure that the new rule
would not apply to truly local cases, the bill exempts from its reach (1) class actions in which
two-thirds or more members of the proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary
defendants are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed, (2) class actions
involving fewer than 100 class members, and (3) cases in which the primary defendants are
states, state officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be
foreclosed from ordering relief. H.R. 1115 § 4(a)(4); S. 1751 § 4(a)(4). Further, it gives the
district court discretion, based upon several enumerated factors, whether to assert jurisdiction
over class actions in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the state in
which the action was originally filed. H.R. 1115 § 4(a)(3); S. 1751 § 4(a)(3).
100. House Bill Aims to Limit Awards in Class Actions, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2003, at C2.
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101
losing their cloture motion on a vote of 59-39. Previous attempts at
102
legislative reform have met similar fates.
With success in Congress elusive, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules has considered other, more modest reform efforts,
consisting of proposed rule changes to the federal rules of civil
103
procedure. These proposed rule changes, however, failed to win
approval from the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.104
Finally, other proposals have called on states voluntarily to enact
uniform legislation that would permit interstate transfer and
105
consolidation of overlapping class actions. Although this would not
provide a complete solution to class action defendants, it would

101. Helen Dewar, GOP is Blocked on Court Award Limits, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at
A4. Despite this defeat, there are ongoing efforts to win passage of this bill before the end of the
108th Congress. To date, however, these efforts have not been successful.
102. Similar bills were introduced in the 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses as well. Though
support for these bills has consistently grown over the years, the efforts to pass such a bill have
fallen short each year, usually stalling in the Senate. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, H.R.
2341, 107th Cong. (2001) (passed House by vote of 233-190, but never passed in Senate); Class
Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001) (never made it out of committee);
Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999) (reported out of Judiciary
Committee, but never voted on by full Senate); Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999,
H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999) (passed House of Representatives by 222-207 vote); Judicial
Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998) (passed House of Representatives but never
made it out of Committee in Senate); Class Action Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2083, 105th Cong.
(1998) (never made it out of committee). The day is drawing near when such a bill may have the
necessary support to win passage through the House of Representatives and Senate, but that
day is not here quite yet.
103. For instance, one proposal would have given district court judges discretion to halt
parallel class litigation in state court if they concluded, on a motion to certify or decertify the
federal class, that class litigation is inappropriate under federal standards. See Brian D. Boyle,
Parallel State and Federal Court Class Actions, 31 THE BRIEF 32, 38 (2002) (discussing the
proposed Rule 23(c)(1)(D)). The proposed language reads:
A court that refuses to certify—or decertifies—a class for failure to satisfy
the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(1) or (2), or for failure to satisfy the standards of Rule
23(b)(1), (2), or (3), may direct that no other court may certify a substantially similar
class to pursue substantially similar claims, issues, or defenses unless a difference of
law or change of fact creates a new certification issue.
Id. A different proposal would have allowed district courts to halt competing state court class
action litigation before it ever started—by enjoining purported class members from
commencing any such litigation. See id. at 38–39 (discussing Proposed Rule 23(g)).
104. Id. It is true that amendments to Rule 23 regarding settlement class actions have
recently been approved and went into effect in December 2003. However, these amendments do
not address problems of overlapping class actions or the question of what standards or
requirements should be applied to certifying settlement classes. Rather, the amendments
focused on amending the process for reviewing settlement classes to provide more procedural
protection to absent parties. Thus, these recent amendments are not relevant to this Note’s
topic.
105. See Wasserman, supra note 96, at 534 (discussing these reform efforts).
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provide potential relief from multiple state court claims proceeding
simultaneously. Both the National Conference of Commissioners on
106
Uniform State Laws and the reporters of the ALI Complex
107
Litigation Project have proposed such measures. However, neither
of these proposals to date has been adopted by the states.108
In mentioning these various reform efforts, this Note does not
attempt to critique the merits of these proposals, many of which are
very appealing. This Note mentions them solely to demonstrate the
dilemma that class action mass tort, product liability, and consumer
fraud defendants are currently facing and the current political
impossibility of adopting any of these proposed solutions.
D. A Measured Response to the Problem
In light of the failure of these and many other proposals, class
action defendants, and the state courts in which these nationwide
claims are filed, have been forced to seek alternative avenues for
bringing finality and closure to such claims. One such solution, as
demonstrated by Cooper Tire, has been to seek certification of a class
for settlement purposes. Though it is not an ideal or long-term
solution, defendants have started to embrace this course as the best
option given the circumstances.109
Under federal law, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,110 the
Supreme Court affirmed the use of settlement classes under Rule

106. See UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 103, 14 U.L.A. 191–94, 201 (Supp. 1999) (“A . . .
court . . . may transfer all or part of the action to a court . . . which consents to the transfer and
can exercise jurisdiction over the matters transferred.”).
107. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
COMPLEX LITIGATION:
STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 4.02, at 201 (1994) (recommending the “formulation of
an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or a Uniform Complex Litigation Act”).
108. See Wasserman, supra note 96, at 534 (“Currently, no vehicle exists for transferring a
case from the court of one state to the court of another state, making consolidation of state/state
dueling class actions pending in different states impossible.”).
109. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 51, § 11:1 (noting that the complexities and
uncertainties of class litigation have sometimes made settlement of these class actions an
attractive option to defendants, because a settlement would have the effect of bringing closure
and finality, through the application of res judicata, to the issue); Francis E. McGovern, The
Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 601–02 (1997)
(noting the trend of defendants seeking to use class action settlements as a means of achieving
“global peace”); Wendy S. White, Creative Uses of State Class Actions, 612 PLI/Lit 379, 381
(1999) (noting the significant increase in the number of mass tort settlement classes filed in state
courts following Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
110. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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111
23. However, the court placed severe restrictions on their use,
holding that settlement classes must meet the same requirements for
112
certification as if the class were being approved for trial. In fact, the
Court stated that Rule 23’s requirements “demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”113 The sole exception
to this rule, the Court stated, was that courts, when confronted with a
request for a settlement-only class, “need not inquire whether the
case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for
114
the proposal is that there be no trial.” Thus, Amchem was a mixed
verdict for settlement classes. Although it endorsed the concept of
settlement classes and created a somewhat more relaxed standard for
their certification by holding that the manageability of the class at
trial need not be considered by a court, it also ruled that settlement
classes must satisfy all the remaining requirements for class
certification, such as commonality and superiority, on an “undiluted,
even heightened” standard.
The result of Amchem’s mixed verdict has been to restrict
severely the availability of the settlement class as a tool for bringing
115
finality and closure to class action claims in federal courts. Given
the federal courts’ recent hostility to the class action mechanism in
the mass tort, products liability, and consumer fraud context, many
federal courts have latched onto the “heightened attention” language
of Amchem to justify decisions to refuse certification to nationwide,
mass tort settlement classes; the result is that federal settlement
classes of this genre often encounter significant disfavor.116

111. See id. at 618 (noting that “all Federal Circuits recognize the utility of Rule 23(b)(3)
settlement classes”).
112. Id. at 620–21.
113. Id. at 620.
114. Id.
115. See John D. Aldock & Richard M. Wyner, The Use of Settlement Class Actions to
Resolve Mass Tort Claims After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 905,
914 (1998) (reviewing federal court decisions following Amchem and concluding that “the
decisions to date . . . suggest that the class certification issue will receive greater scrutiny than
was the case prior to Amchem”); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial
Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 1999 (1999) (noting that, although settlements classes have remained
a viable approach to resolving mass tort litigation after Amchem, the ruling has made the
application of settlement classes much more difficult for the large mass tort matters).
116. See, e.g., Clement v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 176 F.R.D. 15, 21–24 (D. Conn. 1997)
(refusing to certify nationwide class of plaintiffs who had alleged violation of the Consumer
Leasing Act and state unfair trade practices laws and making special note of the heightened
attention required by Amchem); Laughman v. Wells Fargo Leasing Corp., No. 96 C 925, 1997
WL 567800, *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997) (refusing to certify a settlement-only class in a
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Amchem, however, does not apply to state court classes.
Therefore, class action defendants seeking finality and resolution of
these pending nationwide claims have started to turn to state courts
118
for certification of nationwide settlement classes. And some state
courts, seeking a way to bring closure to these claims, have begun to
embrace the nationwide settlement class.
119
For instance, in Cox v. Shell Oil Co., a pre-Amchem case
involving leaky polybutylene pipe installed in hundreds of thousands
of homes, a Tennessee court certified a settlement-only class in order
to bring closure to longstanding litigation. As in Cooper Tire, several
nearly identical class actions had been filed in various state courts,
120
including Alabama, California, Tennessee, and Texas. After a Texas
court refused to certify a settlement class, the Alabama, California,
and Tennessee state judges worked in tandem to push the case
towards a global settlement.121 In its opinion certifying the class and
approving settlement, the Tennessee court suggested that the claims
contained legal issues that might generally make litigation of the
claims difficult, if not impossible.122 However, the court approved the
consumer fraud case and making reference to Amchem’s insistence on heightened scrutiny for
certification of such classes); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle
Continues, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 377–78 (1998) (noting that some courts have seized upon
Amchem as a justification to deny class certification). Of course, the settlement class does
continue to remain an option post-Amchem, and federal courts do continue to certify some
settlement classes. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019–24 (1998) (upholding
certification of nationwide settlement class after thorough analysis of the Amchem decision).
However, Amchem’s language calling for “heightened” scrutiny of settlement class certification
motions has made it more difficult to receive certification of such classes in many federal courts.
117. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619 (deciding specifically the role settlement plays under
Federal Rule 23 in determining the propriety of class certification).
118. See Cabraser, supra note 116, at 378 (noting the migration of state law class actions to
the state courts and arguing that the “migration has in large part been one of necessity, as
federal courts have denied certification or decertified classes that in earlier practice would have
gone forward to the federal system”). Similarly, Professor McGovern notes that:
The class action investment engine and the defendants’ drive for global peace are still
moving apace, but on different tracks. Class actions rejected for trial in federal courts
are now being filed in state courts—and proposed class action settlements rejected by
federal courts are being refiled in state courts.
McGovern, supra note 109, at 602.
119. Civ. A. No. 18844, 1995 WL 775363 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17, 1995).
120. See Erik Milstone, Lawsuit Pipeline: Dueling Polybutylene Class Actions Make Choices
Plumb Difficult for Homeowners, 81 A.B.A. J. 20, 20–21 (Dec. 1995) (describing the numerous
lawsuits filed).
121. See Cox, 1995 WL 775363, at *1 (making reference to the “unprecedented effort” by
the Tennessee, Alabama, and California judges to guide this settlement process to a global
settlement).
122. See id. at *3:
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settlement class anyway, stressing heavily the value and importance of
closure. Striking a different tone from Amchem, the court noted that
[c]ompromises are favored in the law. Neither this Court, nor any
court, has the resources to fully litigate all issues, nor is it always fair
to the parties to do so. The time, cost, and lack of finality of
protracted litigation require certain matters to be settled. . . .
123
Closure is not only appropriate, but timely.

This trend has continued since Amchem. For instance, in 7124
Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp., a California
appeals court upheld a trial court’s certification of a nationwide
settlement class despite strong objections that the case did not meet
the certification requirements and that the trial court had failed to
apply the certification standards of Amchem.125 The case centered on
a nationwide class of present and former 7-Eleven franchisees, who
alleged that 7-Eleven had breached its financial agreements with
them by refusing to share in the “returns, discounts, and allowances”
over a period of several years.126 While acknowledging Amchem, the
127
court upheld the certification of the settlement class. In its opinion,
as in Cox v. Shell Oil, the court stressed both that the case had been
litigated continuously for several years and the strong need for
finality and closure.128
Most recently, this trend has been highlighted by the litigation
129
over the faulty Bridgestone/Firestone tires. In 2001, plaintiffs sought
certification of a nationwide consumer fraud class in federal court.130
Despite winning initial approval in the district court, the nationwide
class was decertified by the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by
131
Judge Easterbrook. Following the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, plaintiffs
The claims . . . have their own legal problems, which, if fully litigated, would delay the
ultimate resolution of these cases for many years to come. If litigated, complex legal
issues would be presented, such as statutes of limitations and repose, choice of
appropriate state laws, liability and other measures of damages.
123. Id. at *2.
124. 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
125. Id. at 795 (noting that though the trial court did not make specific findings on the class
certification standards, its findings could be read so as to satisfy such an inquiry).
126. Id. at 780.
127. Id. at 795.
128. Id. at 787.
129. See supra Part II.B.
130. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D.
Ind. 2001).
131. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
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shifted strategies, filing similar nationwide class actions in numerous
132
different state courts. Attempting to bring closure to this everburgeoning litigation, the defendants agreed to a settlement and
sought certification of a nationwide class for settlement-only purposes
in Texas state court.133 On March 15, 2004, the Texas state court
134
certified the $149 million nationwide settlement class. Although it is
unclear why the parties sought certification of the settlement-only
class in state court as opposed to federal court, these actions suggest
that the parties believed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
receive such closure in the federal courts.135
These cases, taken together, represent an emerging pattern of
state courts certifying nationwide settlement classes.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COOPER TIRE DECISION
This Part analyzes the Cooper Tire court’s holding against the
backdrop of jurisprudence discussed in Part II, advancing two specific
arguments: First, this Part proposes that Cooper Tire is the latest
example of the growing trend of state courts approving a nationwide
settlement class when a federal court would probably not have
granted certification. Second, this Part considers whether such an
approach can be successful—that is, whether the holding can
withstand collateral attack. It concludes that it probably can.

132. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir.
2003).
133. Firestone Settlement Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at C18.
134. Texas Judge Approves Settlement of Bridgestone-Firestone Suits, WALL ST. J., March 16,
2004, at D4.
135. One reason why the parties may have agreed to pursue the settlement in state court,
consistent with this Note’s argument, is that the parties believed that the Seventh Circuit would
not certify even a nationwide settlement class. However, Justice Easterbrook explicitly left that
option open. In his opinion granting the plaintiffs’ request for an order enjoining the
certification of any nationwide class in either federal or state court absent the defendant’s
consent following the Seventh Circuit’s decertification, Judge Easterbrook explicitly noted that
the Seventh Circuit did “not consider the possibility of settlement classes, which pose different
issues.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 766. Further, earlier Seventh Circuit opinions
have approved nationwide, settlement-only class actions, noting that the variations in state law
issues are not as problematic in this area. See, e.g., In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d
743, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, the fact remains that the parties chose to pursue the
settlement-only class in state, rather than federal, courts, indicating that they thought their
chance for approval was greater there than in federal courts.
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A. An Alternative Reading of the Cooper Tire Court’s Holding
In many ways, the dispute in Cooper Tire is extremely suitable
for class action treatment. First, the dispute involves a negative value
claim, because the remedy sought—up to $600 per class member—
would be far outweighed by the cost of individual litigation. Second,
the dispute involves only consumer fraud claims, which the Supreme
Court has held to be particularly apt for class certification.136
However, federal courts would probably refuse to certify this
class for several reasons. First, conflict-of-law concerns might prevent
common questions of law from predominating. The choice-of-law
inquiry is often the determinative factor in the class certification
analysis: If a court concludes that it must apply the laws of fifty states
to the claim, it is unlikely to certify the class because common legal
137
issues would not predominate.
The Cooper Tire court attempted to avoid this problem by
applying New Jersey’s choice of law doctrine and finding that New
Jersey law applied to the entire class. After Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
138
Shutts, a court attempting to apply its own law to nationwide class
actions must show either (1) that there is no conflict between its law
and other states’ laws,139 or (2) that it has “‘significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
140
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’”
Here, interpreting its own choice-of-law rules, the Cooper Tire court
claimed both that there was no conflict between state laws and that
141
New Jersey had significant contacts with the claim.
Although Shutts does imply that a single state’s law can be
applied to a nationwide class in proper circumstances, federal courts,
as a whole, have been reluctant to do so, even in a consumer fraud

136. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“Predominance is a test
readily met in certain cases alleging consumer . . . fraud . . . .”).
137. See Rory Ryan, Comment, Uncertifiable?: The Current Status of Nationwide State-Law
Class Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 479 (2002) (stating that the “aggregate nationwide statelaw class action decisions” suggest that “[i]f the laws of fifty states apply in a nationwide statelaw class action, absent extraordinary circumstances, the class is uncertifiable under rule 23”).
Although manageability issues are also implicated by the choice-of-law problem, these issues do
not apply to settlement classes after Amchem. See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text.
138. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
139. Id. at 816.
140. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
141. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
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142
class. In fact, the holdings of several recent federal cases suggest
that a federal court’s ruling would differ from the Cooper Tire court’s
ruling on both prongs of the choice-of-law analysis. First, several
federal courts have rejected the argument that consumer protection
laws do not vary from state to state.143 Furthermore, federal courts
have recently been resistant to finding that one state’s interests
predominate, emphasizing federalism concerns about the intrusion
upon other states’ interests.144 For instance, in In re Ford Motor Co.
145
Ignition Switch Products Liability Litigation, a federal district court
refused to certify a nationwide class of car purchasers who were suing
Ford over the alleged presence of faulty ignition switches.146 One of
the proposed subclasses, as in Cooper Tire, was a purely economic147
damages class, alleging consumer fraud. In its holding, the court
found that the necessity of applying fifty different state laws to the

142. See Phair, supra note 61, at 835 (noting that the federal appellate courts have created a
strong presumption against certifying a nationwide state law class action because of the
necessity of applying fifty state laws to the claim). Of course, some federal courts have applied a
single state’s law to a nationwide class. See, e.g., Bunnion v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. 97-4877,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727, at *29–30 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1998) (holding that forum law
governed nationwide class); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(finding a selection of forum law constitutional in securities litigation when defendant
maintained its principal place of business in the forum and auditing and financial statement
preparation occurred there). As a whole, the Supreme Court’s choice-of-law jurisprudence has
been far from clear on this subject. See John C. Anderson, Note, Good “Brick” Walls Make
Good Neighbors: Should a State Court Certify A Multistate or Nationwide Class of Indirect
Purchasers?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2019, 2031–32 (2002) (“[C]hoice-of-law has historically been
an area of some difficulty for the Supreme Court, with the resultant failed emergence of a clear
constitutional mandate.”); Phair, supra note 61, at 844 (noting that “the Supreme Court has yet
to provide any clear guidance on the issue”). This confusion has resulted in much literature on
this subject, with authors arguing both for and against the view that a single state law can apply
to a nationwide class. See, e.g., id. at 836 (arguing that the application of a single state law to a
nationwide class is permissible given the proper circumstances); Ryan, supra note 137, at 469
(arguing that application of forum law to nationwide class action is most likely not permitted).
143. For instance, in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., the court held that “[s]tate consumer
protection laws vary considerably, and courts must respect these differences rather than apply
one state’s law to sales in other states with different rules.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002). I elaborate further upon this trend
among federal courts in Part II.A.
144. E.g., Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 563–66 (5th Cir. 2002); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 1996); Dhamer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 183 F.R.D.
520, 532–34 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Phair, supra note 61, at 840 (stating that federal courts have
been resistant to applying one state’s law to a nationwide class because “they place a heavy
emphasis on the plaintiff’s domicile as the relevant factor in determining the applicable law”).
145. 174 F.R.D. 332 (D.N.J. 1997).
146. Id. at 336.
147. Id. at 336–38.
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claim precluded a finding that common issues of law predominated.
Applying New Jersey’s choice-of-law test, the court found that a
single state law could not apply to the entire class because the interest
of “[e]ach plaintiff’s home state . . . in protecting its consumers from
in-state injuries caused by foreign corporations and in delineating the
scope of recovery for its citizens under its own laws” outweighed
those of a single state.149 In so holding, the court explicitly rejected
arguments later relied on by the Cooper Tire court as reasons
justifying the application of a single state’s laws. Specifically, the court
held that the fact that Ford’s headquarters were located in Michigan
and that the cars were manufactured there did not justify the
application of Michigan law.150 Therefore, it is likely that a federal
court would have concluded that the Cooper Tire class action did not
contain common legal issues that predominated because of the
necessity of applying multiple state laws to the claim.
Just as a federal court would probably find that common
questions of law did not predominate in the Cooper Tire case, it
would likely find that common issues of fact also did not
predominate. Whereas the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not
151
require a showing of reliance on the improper conduct, other states’
152
consumer fraud laws do require such a showing. Thus, if a federal
court determined that it could not apply New Jersey law to the entire
class, the necessity of showing individual reliance would probably
convince many federal courts to refuse to certify the class.153 For these
148. Id. at 351.
149. Id. at 348.
150. Id.
151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2002).
152. See Sandra Benson Brantley & Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Commonality of Applicable State
Law in Nationwide or Multistate Class Actions—Deceptive Trade Practices, 18 CLASS ACTION
REP. 188, 198–99 (1995) (compiling a list of several states, such as Arizona, Georgia, Indiana,
and Wyoming, that require a showing of individual reliance under their unfair and deceptive
practices statutes).
153. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 346
(D.N.J. 1997) (refusing to certify a nationwide class of car owners with allegedly defective
ignition switches under fraud theory because, in part, the necessity of proving individual
reliance would swamp common questions of fact). Additionally, several courts have found that,
in class actions against automobile companies involving numerous makes and models of a
particular car or part, common questions of fact do not predominate. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor
Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 360, 372–73, 376 (E.D. La. 1997) (denying
certification of a nationwide class of purchasers of Ford Broncos asserting, among other claims,
a fraud claim arising from alleged deception about the car’s stability because the Bronco was
sold over seven years in varying configurations). Here, at least seven different brands of tires
were implicated, as well as several other brands that were manufactured by defendants but
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reasons, combined with the recent skepticism toward nationwide class
actions among this genre of cases, a federal court would likely not
154
have certified this class.
New Jersey, however, has a more liberal class action rule than
155
Federal Rule 23. Although New Jersey’s class action rule, Rule 4:32
of the Rules Governing Civil Procedure,156 largely mirrors Rule 23(a)
and (b) of the Federal Rules, New Jersey courts have consistently
157
preferred a more liberal reading, especially in consumer fraud cases.
When Cooper Tire came before the New Jersey Superior Court,
however, it was still undetermined to what extent New Jersey favored
certification of such a large, nationwide class action. Although the
Cooper Tire court correctly acknowledged the Supreme Court’s
decision in Shutts that a state could certify a nationwide class, a
review of New Jersey cases shows that New Jersey courts have been
hesitant to do so. Though the Cooper Tire court claimed in its
decision that “New Jersey has allowed certification . . . involving
158
national and multiple state cases,” the case it cited in support,

marketed and sold as private brands. Plaintiffs’ Memo, supra note 16, at 48. Though it is not
clear from the record whether the differences in brands would be important in this case, federal
courts would likely have analyzed these individual factual inquiries closely.
154. Of course, it is true that some federal courts have certified nationwide, state law class
actions. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding
the certification of a nationwide class of minivan owners alleging defectively designed rear
liftgate); Elkins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CivA96-296-Civ-T-17B, 1998 WL 133741, at *3,
11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 1998) (certifying nationwide class of life insurance owners on, among
other things, negligent misrepresentation allegations). However, the prevalent hostile trend
makes this result unlikely.
155. Philip Stephen Fuoco & Robert F. Williams, Class Actions in New Jersey State Courts,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 737, 744 (1993).
156. N.J. CT. R. 4:32-1.
157. E.g., In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736, 747 (N.J. 1983) (“[W]e are
mindful that the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of
consumer fraud.”); Delgozzo v. Kenny, 628 A.2d 1080, 1086 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(“New Jersey courts . . . have consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally
construed. Indeed, a class action ‘should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is
inappropriate or improper.’”). New Jersey’s liberal interpretation of its rule is predicated upon
its strong favoring of aggregation mechanisms—a stark contrast to the federal courts’ distrust of
such procedures. See, e.g., Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 294 A.2d 7, 10 (N.J. 1972):
If each victim were remitted to an individual suit, the remedy could be illusory, for
the individual loss may be too small to warrant a suit . . . . If there is to be relief, a
class action should lie unless it is clearly infeasible.
....
To that end, a court should be slow to hold that a suit may not proceed as a class
action.
158.

Final Order, supra note 10, at 36.
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159
Delgozzo v. Kenny, does not clearly support this proposition. In
Delgozzo, the plaintiffs sought at the trial level to certify a nationwide
class of over 35,000 individuals who had purchased “Blue Flame” gas
heaters that allegedly were defective.160 The claim was predicated on
allegations of consumer fraud, and was limited solely to claims for
161
economic damages. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court
reversed the trial court’s refusal to certify the class.162
In its ruling, the Delgozzo appeals court addressed the question
of whether it could certify a nationwide class. On the one hand, the
court stated that “[t]he problems inherent in certifying a class
163
presenting conflict of laws issues are not unsurmountable.” The
164
Cooper Tire court emphasized this point. On the other hand, the
court continued on to state:

[B]ut, as we acknowledge, as the geographical diversity grows, the
management problems increase commensurately.
Certainly, however, a class limited to those who have sufficient
contacts with New Jersey, could have been certified. Significantly,
plaintiffs’ position at the hearing on their motion was to accept a
class certification consisting solely of New Jersey purchasers if that
165
was the only way to “get a class certified.”

Therefore, the court directed “the trial judge to certify a class to
include at least the New Jersey purchasers or users of defendants’
166
products.” Thus, despite suggestions to the contrary, Delgozzo does
not stand clearly for the proposition that New Jersey courts are
willing to certify a nationwide class.
Adding further credence to this point is the fact that, since
Delgozzo and prior to Cooper Tire, the New Jersey courts have only
once approved a nationwide trial class, despite being confronted by
167
168
the issue on several occasions. Kropinski v. Johnson & Johnson is
159. 628 A.2d 1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
160. Id. at 1082.
161. Id. at 1083–84.
162. Id. at 1094.
163. Id. at 1092.
164. Final Order, supra note 10, at 36.
165. Delgozzo, 628 A.2d at 1092.
166. Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
167. See Cartiglia v. Johnson & Johnson Co., No. MID-L-2754-01, 2002 WL 1009473, at *16
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 24, 2002) (refusing to certify a nationwide, non-personal injury
class of plaintiffs in suit against a prescription drug company for violations of the Consumer
Fraud Act, because plaintiff had not demonstrated requisite ascertainable loss); Carroll v.
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the one prior instance in which a New Jersey court certified a
169
nationwide, state law trial class. In that case, which involved a
nationwide consumer fraud suit alleging deceptive advertising and
cost practices in marketing two brands of contact lenses, the New
Jersey Superior Court recognized that its courts had refused to certify
similar nationwide class actions, but found this case distinguishable
because the common issues predominated to a greater extent than in
the previous cases. The court noted specifically that this case involved
allegations of deceptive cost practices of a prescribed product, as
opposed to false advertising claims involving multiple different
representations made by defendants at different times.170 Cooper Tire
arguably falls closer to the latter genre of cases because it included
allegations of deceptive trade practices involving at least seven
different brands of tires and varying representations over an extended
171
period of time.
Thus, the Cooper Tire court’s decision to certify a nationwide
settlement class represents, at the least, an aggressive use of the
state’s liberal class action statute. Relying heavily upon (1) New
Jersey’s liberal interpretations of the class action requirements, (2)
the fact that this was a case well suited for class action treatment
because it was a negative value, consumer fraud claim, and (3) an
aggressive reading of its own choice-of-law rule, the court decided to
172
certify the settlement class. However, even given New Jersey’s
liberal class action rule, New Jersey case law does not clearly suggest
that New Jersey courts would have certified this class for trial.
Instead, the court’s holding can be read as creating a more lenient
standard for the approval of settlement class actions so as to bring
closure to the case, given the lack of such avenues on the federal
Cellco P’ship, 713 A.2d 509, 513–14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (overturning certification
of nationwide class of cellular telephone service purchasers who had brought a state Consumer
Fraud Act, common law fraud, and common law negligent misrepresentation claim against
defendant, citing conflict-of-law concerns); Gross v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer
Pharms. Co., 696 A.2d 793, 799–800 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (refusing to certify
nationwide class of Pepcid users who had brought a consumer fraud and common law fraud
claim against defendant for falsely advertising product, because questions of ascertainable loss
and causation prevented certification).
168. No. A-3979-97T1, 1999 WL 33603132 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 1999).
169. Id. at *2.
170. Id. at *1–2.
171. The allegations in Cooper Tire involved at least seven different brands of tires, as well
as several other brands that were manufactured by defendants but marketed and sold as private
brands. Plaintiffs’ Memo, supra note 16, at 48.
172. See supra Part I.
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level. Though not stated by the court, one can read this case as
refusing to follow the holding of Amchem and applying a more
lenient standard to the certification of settlement-only classes.
Did the court improperly certify this nationwide class? Did it too
loosely apply the state’s choice-of-law requirement? As shown above,
it could indeed be argued that the answer to both of these questions is
yes. The beauty of this settlement, however, is that it is unlikely that
either side will appeal this decision because both sides supported the
settlement. Additionally, it is unlikely that many absent class
members will attempt to attack the decision because not enough
money is at stake. Thus, so long as this ruling can withstand collateral
attack by any class members who did wish to challenge this decision,
the approval of this settlement class will bring closure to this claim.
B. Is the Ruling Protected from Collateral Attack?
The Cooper Tire court’s goal was to bring finality to this
controversy. Was it successful? To explore this question, one must
consider whether the approved settlement can withstand collateral
attack. If this decision is vulnerable to collateral attack, the Cooper
Tire court’s approach to bringing closure to such claims would be of
limited value. For several reasons, this ruling would most likely
withstand collateral attack.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause mandates that sister states give
judgments rendered by other states at least the same preclusive effect
173
as given in the judgment-rendering state. Similarly, the Full Faith
and Credit Act mandates that the judicial proceedings of any state
“shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State . . . from which they are taken.”174 In Matsushita Electric
175
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, the Supreme Court held that “a judgment
entered in a class action . . . is presumptively entitled to full faith and
credit under the . . . Act.”176
The Court in Matsushita held that a class action settlement
approved by a state court—whether it released state or exclusively

173. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (“Full faith and credit thus generally requires
every State to give to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be
accorded in the State which rendered it.”) (emphasis added).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
175. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
176. Id. at 374.
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federal claims—deserves preclusive effect so long as the state in
177
question would have granted such a claim preclusive effect.
Therefore, the Cooper Tire court’s release of claims, including
exclusively federal claims, has preclusive effect so long as a New
Jersey court would have granted such a claim preclusive effect.
In Matsushita, the Court’s analysis of whether Delaware would
grant preclusive effect to settlements was made easy by the fact that
Delaware courts had addressed that issue directly. Previous Delaware
court opinions had held that “when the Court of Chancery approves a
global release of claims, its settlement judgment should preclude
178
ongoing or future federal court litigation of any released claims.”
New Jersey courts, however, have not ruled directly on the issue of
whether they would grant preclusive effect to a settlement releasing
exclusively federal claims. The Court in Matsushita recognized this
potential difficulty, stating that the “inquiry into state law would not
always yield a direct answer.”179 In such a situation, the Court directed
a federal court to “find guidance from general state law on the
180
preclusive force of settlement judgments.” New Jersey courts have
long articulated a strong public policy of enforcing settlement
181
agreements. As a result, New Jersey courts “‘will strain to give
effect to the terms of a settlement whenever possible.’”182 Based upon
this strong preference for enforcing settlement judgments, and absent
more direct language from New Jersey courts, a court would thus
probably conclude that New Jersey would have granted preclusive
effect to this settlement class.
Even if a state’s judgment would otherwise deserve preclusive
effect, “absent class members may avoid the preclusive effect of a
judgment entered in one such action if they were not afforded due
183
process therein.” In nationwide, state law class actions for money
177. See id. at 386–87 (holding that a Delaware ruling approving a class action settlement
that released an exclusive federal claim deserved preclusive effect because Delaware courts
would have granted it preclusive effect and no exceptions to § 1738 applied).
178. Id. at 377.
179. Id. at 375.
180. Id.
181. See Tabaac v. City of Atlantic City, 417 A.2d 56, 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980)
(“Settlement of litigation of all kinds is to be encouraged; public policy supports its amicable
disposition.”).
182. Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 18 N.J. Tax 328, 333 (N.J. Tax Ct.
1999) (quoting Dept. of Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., 503 A.2d 331, 333 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985).
183. Wasserman, supra note 96, at 494.
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damages being adjudicated in state courts, due process requires that
the absent parties lacking minimum contacts with the state (1) be
adequately represented by the named plaintiffs, (2) receive notice of
the action, and (3) be given an opportunity to be heard and to opt
184
out. In certifying the class and approving the settlement, however,
185
courts already will have found these to be present. Thus, a question
is raised whether the absent members are barred, as a matter of issue
preclusion, from relitigating these issues. There is no clear answer to
this question, as courts have taken various approaches.186
Even assuming that an absent class member challenging the
ruling in Cooper Tire does have the right to relitigate the due process
requirements, it is unlikely that he would succeed. First, the class
187
members were granted the option to opt out and to be heard.
Second, the record indicates that adequate notice was provided to the
class members. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,188 the Supreme
Court described the notice required to bind an absent class member
in these nationwide, money-damages class actions brought in state
court, stating that “[t]he notice must be the best practicable,
184. Id. at 494–95. These due process protections were imposed for these types of class
actions claims by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
185. Wasserman, supra note 96, at 495.
186. Some courts have addressed collateral challenges to the adequacy of representation
without mentioning issue preclusion. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72–73 (5th Cir.
1973) (finding the representation of a prior class to be inadequate without mentioning issue
preclusion at all). Other courts have expressly stated that issue preclusion does not bar absent
class members from relitigating the issue of adequacy of representation. See, e.g., Battle v.
Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1512–13 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (stating that an absent
class member is “not bound by the initial court’s determination that she received due process”),
aff’d, 974 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1992). Still other courts have held that class members who appear
at a hearing in the first action and contest the adequacy of representation are bound by the
court’s finding. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 142–43 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing to vacate a Louisiana court judgment when
appellants did not exercise their opt-out rights and actively participated in the settlement
approval process). Finally, other courts have held that absent class members are bound by the
finding of adequacy of representation even if they did not participate in the fairness hearing.
See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1560–61 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that Delaware court had personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff who did not appear so
that plaintiffs were bound by the release approved by the court). Recently, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether Agent Orange class members could pursue
individual claims by bringing collateral attack on the adequacy of representation, but the Court
split 4-4 and issued no opinion. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 539 U.S. 111 (2003). Thus, the
issue remains unsettled.
187. See Final Order, supra note 10, at 8–10 (noting that defendants were informed of their
right to opt out and had the right to voice opinions at a fairness hearing held on January 29,
2002).
188. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.’ The notice should describe
189
the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it.” When a potential class
member’s address is available through reasonable efforts, some form
190
of direct notice is generally required. However, when direct
notification is unreasonably burdensome, publication and
representative notice is sufficient.191
In Cooper Tire, based upon the report of class action notice
specialists, the court ruled that direct notice to class members would
be impracticable given the high cost and difficulty of providing direct
192
notice to each class member. Instead, the court approved a notice
plan that combined various methods to reach the absent class
members, including (1) bilingual—English and Spanish—notices in
more than 900 Sunday newspapers throughout the United States,193
(2) the use of a toll-free information line, (3) Internet advertising, and
194
(4) a website to disseminate information. After reviewing the
parties’ notice plan, the Cooper Tire court held in its final approval of
the settlement agreement that “the comprehensive Notice Program
satisfied the requirements of due process by apprising the class
members of their rights pursuant to the settlement.”195 Given these
factual findings, it is unlikely that a subsequent court would find the
provided notice violates due process requirements.
Finally, it is doubtful that an absent class member could
successfully claim that he did not receive adequate representation. A
showing of adequate representation requires that (1) the named
plaintiffs do not have interests antagonistic to those of the class, and
(2) the plaintiffs’ attorney be qualified, experienced, and generally

189. Id. at 812 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15
(1950)).
190. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).
191. Sulcov v. 2100 Linwood Owners, Inc., 696 A.2d 31, 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
192. Final Order, supra note 10, at 31. Specifically, the parties concluded that Cooper Tire
could only identify approximately 3 percent of the putative class members, because only 3
percent of tire purchasers registered their tires with the defendant. Plaintiffs’ Memo, supra note
16, at 48. Further, given the manner in which the registrations were stored, the parties estimated
it would cost about $420,000 to compile the addresses for the 3 percent. Id. at 49.
193. Final Order, supra note 10, at 31.
194. Id. at 32. As designed, Cooper Tire owners would see the notice an average of 3.5
times. Id. “Including repeat exposures, the notice appeared in print media . . . more than 562
million times.” Id.
195. Id.

SMALLWOOD.DOC

1170

07/07/04 1:39 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1137

196
able to conduct the proposed litigation. Both of these requirements
appear to have been met in Cooper Tire. First, the named plaintiffs’
claims were essentially the same as those of the other class members
because they spring from the same legal theory.197 Additionally,
because the claim involved only economic damages—the loss in the
value of the tire—nothing in the nature of the injuries materially
separated the named plaintiffs from the class.198 Second, the court
found the class counsel to be “highly experienced” class action
attorneys who are “known for [their] willingness to try class actions to
verdict.”199 Thus, it is unlikely that an absent plaintiff would succeed
in challenging the adequacy of representation. Therefore, the
approach taken by Cooper Tire would likely withstand collateral
attack.

IV. THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM COOPER TIRE
Cooper Tire represents a state court experimenting with its own
laws to find a solution to a growing problem facing numerous class
action defendants—how to bring closure and finality to nationwide,
state law class actions. This Part first discusses and responds to the
various critiques of the Cooper Tire court’s approach. It then sets
forth the central lesson gleaned from the Cooper Tire court’s
experiment—the necessity of creating, at least until a more
permanent solution is able to be implemented, a settlement-only class
within Federal Rule 23, whereby nationwide settlement-only classes
would be reviewed under more relaxed standards.
A. Critiques of the Cooper Tire Approach
One legitimate response to Cooper Tire might be the following:
Even if the approach taken by the Cooper Tire court produced a good
result in this case, and even if Cooper Tire represents a state court
truly seeking to do the right thing by solving a legitimate problem
facing both the defendants and plaintiffs, not all courts are as pureintentioned as the Cooper Tire court. What is to say that Cooper Tire
represents a majority result, and what would prevent a more corrupt

196.
197.
198.
199.

1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 51, § 3.22.
Preliminary Certification, supra note 45, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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state court, or more conniving plaintiffs or defendants, from using this
technique to further much less noble goals in the future?
Much truth lies behind this concern, although it is limited, of
course, by the possibility that unlike the Cooper Tire settlement, less
noble settlements are more easily attackable collaterally on grounds
of inadequate representation. Numerous commentators have written
on the growing trend of state courts certifying nationwide class
actions, and their comments have been, for the most part, decidedly
negative. For example, some commentators have focused on the role
of class counsel, emphasizing (a) the growing problems of judge and
200
forum shopping, (b) the danger of collusion among defendants and
plaintiffs’ attorneys,201 (c) the growing trend of inventory
settlements,202 (d) the threat of plaintiffs extorting settlements by
203
threatening defendants with ruinous liability, and (e) the trend of
plaintiffs’ attorneys benefiting from the allegedly lax review standards
to prosper at the expense of the absent class members.204 Other
commentators, focusing on the negative repercussions that have and
will continue to emerge from this trend, highlight (a) the increased
pressure on plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle,205 (b) the danger that
206
settlements will deny courts and absent parties critical information,
200. See supra note 4.
201. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1364–67 (1995) (suggesting that defendants will often work out
agreements with certain plaintiffs’ attorneys offering above-average attorneys’ fees in return for
lower-than-average settlement agreements).
202. See, e.g., id. at 1373–75 (“[B]oth sides have an incentive to trade a settlement of the
plaintiffs’ attorney’s entire inventory (on terms favorable to the attorney) for a global
settlement in a class action of all future claims (on terms favorable to the defendants).”).
203. For an early, yet typical, view, see Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (describing the threat of litigation to compel settlements as a “form
of legalized blackmail”). See also Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist
Perspective, 80 C
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and (c) the danger of an invasion of the entrenched concept of
207
separate sovereignty. Still other commentators have argued that
some state judges employ extremely lax certification standards so as
to apply their state law to a nationwide class, thereby essentially
creating magnet states and a “race to the bottom.”208
Based upon these critiques of the current system, many
commentators would most likely argue that the best solution to the
problem of overlapping class actions is to eliminate, or at least
severely restrict, the ability of state courts to certify nationwide, state
law class actions, rather than to hold up states that do so as examples
of the “beauty of federalism.”
This critique, however, underemphasizes the importance of
closure and finality. Additionally, although cases such as Cooper Tire
may be the minority, and the negative portrait painted by these
commentators may be largely accurate, the point this Note
underscores is that, to date, reformers have not been able to put in
place a comprehensive solution to this problem.
Because of this failure to enact a comprehensive solution, many
nationwide, state law class action defendants do face a legitimate
problem of figuring out how to bring closure to such claims. Even if
their situation is the minority one, and even if the norm in class action
treatment by state courts is characterized by the deep flaws described
above, this does not detract from the legitimacy of the problem these
defendants face. Seeking a way to bring closure to the Cooper Tire
case, the plaintiffs, defendant, and state court settled on what they
must have believed to be the best choice under the circumstances. By
focusing solely on the negative trends and troubling problems raised
by state courts certifying nationwide, state law classes, commentators
have ignored the reality that at least some portion of these
settlements arise from a legitimate desire to achieve closure.
Thus, in light of this present reality, it is important to consider
whether any temporary solution is available to facilitate the interest
of closure. Does the approach taken in Cooper Tire suggest the
206. See, e.g., id. at 475–83 (noting that the growing trend of dueling class actions and
pressure for quick settlements often leads to absent class members, judges, and even class
counsels being deprived of critical information regarding the case because there are no true
adversaries in settlement).
207. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 514, 515–16
(1996) (recognizing that the trend of overlapping class actions threatens the concept of separate
sovereignty).
208. See supra note 5.
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existence of a temporary fix that could ameliorate the problem of
achieving closure facing these class action defendants? Section B
discusses whether a rule change could permit and encourage the
increased use of the approach taken in Cooper Tire—the settlement
class—for “legitimate” purposes, while minimizing the “abusive”
application of such an approach.
B. A Proposed Change to Rule 23
Based upon the lessons learned from Cooper Tire, this Note
proposes that Federal Rule 23 be amended to create a more lenient
standard for certifying settlement-only classes on the federal level—to
federalize, essentially, the Cooper Tire approach. This suggestion is
not novel. In fact, in 1996, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
proposed amending Rule 23(b) to create a fourth type of class—the
209
so-called settlement class. The language of this proposal provides a
strong starting point for this Note’s proposed rule amendment. The
1996 proposal would have permitted a district court to certify such a
class if “the parties to a settlement request certification under
subdivision (b)(3) for the purposes of settlement even though the
requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for trial.”210 Thus,
a money-damages settlement class would still be required to meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a), but would not be required to meet the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)—the predominance and superiority
tests. This language would incorporate the Amchem holding that trial
manageability issues need not be considered when reviewing a
settlement class, but would extend Amchem’s holding further,
creating a more relaxed and easily attainable certification standard.
The predominance and superiority requirements are often the two
largest roadblocks to class certification,211 so removal of these
requirements would greatly ease the certification of such classes.
This Note’s proposed rule would go even further, however, and
would explicitly state that settlement classes should be viewed
favorably by courts and that, to promote the use of settlement classes
209. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 622 (1997).
210. Id. (quoting Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Request for Comment, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure (1996)).
211. See Martin L.C. Feldman, Predominance and Products Liability Class Actions: An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2000) (noting that the Federal Rule
23(b)(3) inquiry is much more demanding than the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement).
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for providing closure, courts should apply more relaxed standards
when reviewing whether a settlement-only class meets the Rule 23(a)
requirements. Given the federal courts’ resistance, even after
Amchem’s removal of the manageability inquiry, to certifying
nationwide settlement classes, any proposed settlement-class rule
should contain explicit language directing federal courts to apply a
more lax standard to reviewing settlement-only class certifications.
Although not all claims will be able to take advantage of this rule,
because not all claims can be brought within federal jurisdiction,
many of these types of claims can be structured so as to fall within
federal jurisdiction if the parties so choose.
This rule would have several advantages. First, as demonstrated
by Cooper Tire, given the atmosphere in Congress, this approach is
arguably the best one as it did provides significant benefits to all
parties involved. As in Cooper Tire, it would provide the defendant
with finality and closure to a costly and damaging litigation process
and would allow it to avoid the frightful prospect of a high-stakes
trial. For the plaintiffs, settlement would provide them with
compensation and enable them to access these benefits much sooner
than if they were forced to litigate this claim all the way through to
trial. Although the plaintiffs may be able to win more generous terms
by not settling, there is no certainty of that. Finally, the court system
would also benefit from this rule, because the settlement allows it to
provide an efficient enforcement of the law (deterrence) and also
compensate a large class of individuals. In light of the dangers that
critics of settlement classes constantly raise, perhaps this approach
would not be the perfect solution in an ideal world. However, given
the problems of overlapping class actions, and the lack of other viable
alternatives for bringing closure to such claims, it would be a
defendable temporary solution.
Second, making this approach available on the federal level
would facilitate greater use of such settlement classes. As a result of
the federal courts’ recent hostility to the certification of nationwide
classes, it has been difficult for parties to gain approval of nationwide
212
Further, despite the
settlement classes on the federal level.
examples of Cooper Tire and a few other recent cases, the use of this

212. See Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 871, 877 (2001) (“Federal courts . . . have become reluctant to certify these
types of cases for a class action trial and have recently made the certification of class action
settlement significantly more rigorous and more expensive.”).
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approach on the state level has been constrained by the difficulty of
coordinating a truly global settlement among various state courts. As
the Cooper Tire court emphasized, it took a unique level of interstate
coordination to reach the global settlement. Such coordination
213
between state courts, though becoming more common, is still rare.
The implementation of a more lenient standard for settlement classes
on the federal level—where the ability of federal courts to consolidate
claims among various jurisdictions through MDL is unmatched on the
state level214—may encourage more pervasive use of this potentially
advantageous procedure.
At the same time, providing for a more lenient settlement-class
standard on the federal level would provide some level of safeguard
against the state court abuses alleged by many in regards to
nationwide, state law class actions. The federal courts are not subject
to the same claims of corruption and lax treatment of procedural
215
concerns as are state courts. Likewise, federal courts, in general,
216
have more procedural safeguards than state courts. Thus, by
encouraging the parties to coordinate these nationwide settlementclass agreements on the federal level, one can encourage the
“legitimate” use of nationwide, state law settlement classes, while at
the same time providing a mechanism to control the “abusive” use of
this procedure on the state level.
A valid response to this argument might go as follows: If states
were still free to certify these nationwide, state law settlement classes
(or trial classes), would providing this approach on the federal level
really achieve anything? Why would a rational class action plaintiffs’
attorney agree to pursue a nationwide settlement class in the federal
courts if he or she felt that a state court with less procedural
protections is equally available?

213. See Paul D. Rheingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State Courts,
31 SETON HALL L. REV. 910, 913–16 (describing efforts to increase interstate cooperation in
nationwide class actions and highlighting a few models to follow).
214. See Miller, supra note 207, at 541 (“The reasons for federal-state court centralization
are straightforward. The courts in the several states do not have sufficient centralizing power to
ensure the orderly and efficient disposition of large-scale class action cases.”).
215. For authors who have alleged that certain state courts have been applying excessively
lax class action standards for various improper purposes, see supra note 5.
216. See John Conyers, Jr., Class Action “Fairness”—A Bad Deal for the States and
Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 505–08 (2003) (reviewing the various state law class
action rules and finding that a significant number of states have “explicitly rejected the modern
formulation of Rule 23 and chosen a certification procedure far less imposing”).
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There are several reasons why parties would take advantage of a
more lenient settlement-class standard provided on the federal level.
Defendants, obviously, would prefer to pursue a nationwide
settlement agreement in federal court, given the additional
procedural safeguards and protections on the federal level. Further,
although plaintiffs might prefer to be in state court, pursuing
settlement in federal court does have certain advantages for them,
namely, the additional tools with which to coordinate nationwide and
overlapping cases on the federal level. Finally, even assuming that,
despite the benefits offered by MDL on the federal level, plaintiffs
would still rather pursue such agreements in a state court, it is likely
that, in at least some circumstances, class action defendants will be
able to drive the plaintiffs to the federal forum. This could be done by
using either the “carrot” or the “stick” approach. Defendants could
use the “carrot” approach by offering more attractive settlement
offers if the plaintiffs agree to pursue the certification in federal court.
Alternatively, they could use the “stick” approach by attempting to
influence who is selected as lead attorney for the settlement class.
Certain plaintiff firms practice predominantly in either federal or
state courts. By pushing for the selection of a lead plaintiffs’ attorney
who predominately practices in federal courts, the defendants can
increase their odds of driving the nationwide settlement efforts to the
federal courts.
The 1996 proposal was tabled when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Amchem, the hope being that Amchem’s holding would
217
resolve the issue. However, this hope did not come to pass, as many
federal courts continue to scrutinize harshly settlement-class
certifications after Amchem, often refusing to certify them.218 As cases
like Cooper Tire demonstrate, this resistance to certifying nationwide,
state law settlement classes on the federal level continues to cause
significant problems for plaintiffs, defendants, and state courts alike,
forcing the parties to state court in seek of finality and closure. Thus,
Cooper Tire, as well the larger context from which the case emerged,
suggests that it might be beneficial to revisit this idea.

217.
218.

Class Action Reform Gets a Shot in the Arm, 69 DEF. COUNSEL J. 263, 266 (2002).
See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
When understood in its larger context, Cooper Tire provides an
example of state courts, plaintiffs, and defendants alike seeking to
solve a difficult problem: how to best provide closure and finality to a
nationwide, state law, class action claim, given that federal courts
remain hostile to such claims and at least one state is likely to certify
such a claim for trial purposes. In the absence of a solution emerging
on the federal level, a few state courts, like the Cooper Tire court,
have used the freedom of applying state class action rules to search
for a solution. These cases should be viewed as a demonstration of
the beauty of federalism. Justice Brandeis described the states as
laboratories of democracy in which different jurisdictions adopt
differing rules and the citizens of other states and the nation at large
can observe the rules’ effects.219 Here, New Jersey was serving as such
a laboratory.
When considered in this light, Cooper Tire is an important case
for two reasons. First, it clearly demonstrates the vexing dilemma
currently facing many state courts. Second, it provides those in search
of a more comprehensive solution to this dilemma with an important
example from which to learn. Although valid criticisms can be made
about the approach taken by the Cooper Tire court, in the end, its
decision to certify a nationwide settlement class, even when it may
not have certified such a class for trial purposes, was the best choice
given the circumstances. The lessons from its experiment support
another temporary solution to the problem of bringing closure to such
nationwide, state law class actions: the creation of a more lenient
standard for certifying settlement-only classes under Federal Rule 23.

219. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).

